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Santrauka. Intelektinės atsakomybės, siejamos su globalizacijos procesais, klausimas yra filosofinė pro-
blema (nuo Sokrato iki moderniosios filosofijos). Negalima filosofuoti neatsakant į šį klausimą. Gerai žinoma, 
kad Sokratas iki savo mirties tvirtai stovėjo savo žemėje kalbėdamas apie savo ir kitų pareigą – diskutuoti dėl 
tiesos apibrėžimų, kad ir kokia būtų jų kilmė. Intelektinę dorybę jis suprato kaip reikalavimą atverti diskursyvią 
sritį, vadinamą poliu, kuriame dikutuojama dėl tiesos. Tai rodo, kad filosofijos uždavinys – išsaugoti polio 
atvirumą. Polyje turi būti tikrinami ir svarstomi visi teiginiai ir visos teorijos. Vadinasi, kai kalbame apie 
intelektualo atsakomybę, turime prisiminti filosofijos uždavinius, kuriuos apibrėžė Sokratas. Tačiau mūsų 
padėtis yra visiškai kitokia negu klasikiniuose Atėnuose. Ontologinės ir metafizinės moderniosios filosofijos 
formos skatina svarstyti, ar mes apskritai galime mąstyti apie santykį tarp intelektualo ir atsakomybės. 
Todėl mūsų paskirtis – diskutuoti apie tai, kokios dabartinės aplinkybės, vertos minėto filosofijos uždavinio, 
atsiveria intelektualui.
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1. Modern western universal  
Identity
Postmodern texts inclusive of deconstruc-
tive logics have proclaimed the death of iden-
tity and specifically the identity of the subject. 
The problem is that they were not seriously 
concern what is the subject that was challen-
ged. Based on our previous notions of scien-
tific method and reconstruction of the world 
in favor of humanity there is the background 
subject that has no pregiven definitions. The 
modern subject that has been universalized in 
various pronouncements that include United 
Nations’ universal human rights, both indivi-
dual and cultural, and postmodern claims that 
demand respect for different cultural styles to 
self determination are premised on a modern 
understanding of subject as self generating. 
At the dawn of Western modernity, Pico de 
la Mirandolla has announced that the human 
has no nature, has no essence, has no rules by 
which to live, and therefore whatever nature 
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the human will posses whatever rules will be 
followed whether scientific or political will 
have to be invented as if “out of nothing.” 
While previous arguments leading to 
modern ontology and metaphysics construc-
ted a modern subject as a place of qualitative, 
although non-existing experiences and ref-
lection upon itself, a further task is to expli-
cate this subject at its very base. We made a 
suggestion that the modern subject intends to 
be self created without any other conditions, 
including theological, scientific, and ontolo-
gical to the extent that the very distinctions 
between those terms are equally invented 
without precedence. This is the intentionality 
that comprises the background for the arti-
culation of what a human is as self created, a 
being with divine complex. 
Ontologically speaking, there is no 
pregiven subject that can be used as a crite-
rion to determine what this subject is. Even 
Descartes could not avoid this intentionali-
ty when he argued that despite its power, an 
evil genius cannot do anything against the 
fact that I constitute my own thoughts prior 
to truth and falsity. In short, the subject here 
escapes even and infinite power. The subject 
is posited as totally self constituting without 
any conditions or, to speak with Kant, an un-
conditional subject. It seems that at this level, 
the constitution of modern subject has no 
essential criteria that would be used to judge 
what the subject is as identity. This type of self 
creative subject is totally autonomous, and 
its autonomy creates unconditional methods 
and theories that then through an autono-
mous will and body practice it can create its 
own environment. As noted, a major aspect 
of this creation is scientific methodology 
and technology. This unconditional subject 
is the very principle and purpose of modern 
Western science and philosophy. As Marx 
inadvertently noted the future man, having 
gone through the labor of transforming the 
environment and the human in accordance 
with rules of total mastery of nature, will be 
in a position to be totally self created. Hence, 
the beginning of modernity is equally its telos 
where the logic of self creation of the subject 
subtends the scientific, social, and political 
theories that play a role in establishing the 
conditions for this “subject.” 
At this level, we reach once again the 
principle on the basis of which the Others of 
the other parts of the world are to judge them-
selves: have they have established the conditi-
ons that would allow them to be free form all 
the blind material natural forces and be in a 
position not only to master such forces, but 
to create those forces in order to allow the hu-
man to use them for self creation. This is the 
subject as sui generis and the final reason for 
human history. In this sense, the efforts to de-
construct this kind of self generating subject 
may fail because the subject at the outset does 
not have any identity. It promises the uncon-
ditional conditions for everyone to acquire 
self identity, to become any identity. This way, 
the postmodern logic is premised on the mo-
dern autonomous subject. The postmodern 
logic in principle claims that all cultural iden-
tities, including our own, have no causal, na-
tural, supernatural necessitation, but are pure 
rhetorical constructs. This means that they 
still accept the self creation of the modern 
subject that invents its own logic for mastery 
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of its own world and for self definition. The 
egological self definition is only one among 
many options. The postmodern globalization 
assumes this universal self generating subject 
that invents different cultures without any na-
tural, material, psychological conditions. Af-
ter all, postmodernity claims that everything 
is a construct. The very notion of a construct 
is premised on modern autonomous uncon-
ditional subject. This subject is universalized 
as the possibility of identity for anyone. That 
is anyone can create of himself or herself wha-
tever they want. 
Of course there is no one specific iden-
tity that is offered, but only the process by 
which everyone can either invent their iden-
tities or accept the identities offered by their 
cultures. This is to say it is impossible for any 
culture to claim that it has an identity without 
having accepted the logic of choice between 
the right of every individual to make his/
her own identity, or the right of a particular 
group to respect their own identity. The glo-
balizing universality of the modern subject is 
being proliferated by postmodernity in such a 
way that the others in their own self reflecti-
on upon who they are, are already placed in a 
context wherein they must play out their lives, 
between what they can be as universal indivi-
duals or what they can maintain as members 
of their culture. 
The autonomous self creating subject 
that is being globalized as universal has be-
come a background on which the Others as 
culturally different would be inscribed with 
their own rights to maintain their culture as 
singular, individual, unique, with a right to 
self preservation. This self preservation is a 
phenomenon that has no basis in any onto-
logical, metaphysical, or theological claims 
since all these are equally unconditional cul-
tural inventions. Therefore, they will have to 
be adjudicated in power confrontations each 
calling for the maintenance of its own posi-
tion as means to preserve a cultural identity. 
Nonetheless in principle it is impossible to 
say what the limits are to this self creation 
syndrome and hence no definition can be of-
fered concerning the criteria by which we can 
treat one another. 
Resultantly, modern West, on the basis 
of its own ontology and metaphysics of the 
will, cannot constitute intellectual responsi-
bility for itself and for the others. Some of the 
intellectuals, engaged in helping the others 
in development, follow the same globalizing 
logic of willful destruction – and do so on a 
hidden premise of evolution: the unenlighte-
ned others are on a lesser level of evolution 
and hence have to be brought up to modern 
instrumental rationality by discarding their 
outdated myths and modes of life. Of cour-
se such discarding will not offer an avenue to 
some metaphysical truth about “reality in it-
self,” but only to the metaphysics of the will to 
be part of the arbitrary treatment of the envi-
ronment and others and hence part of the po-
wer confrontations that dominate the current 
social, political, economic, and technocratic 
events – to become part of the syndrome of 
modern-postmodern West.
2. Multiplicity of Cultures  
and discourses 
Nonetheless, the globalizing logic, en-
countering other cultures, must face up to 
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the possible fact that it is logically self con-
tradictory. To lead to this self contradiction 
it is necessary to point to some problems in 
cultural understanding. Cultural anthropo-
logy has to contend with the following issu-
es, specifically ones that require methodolo-
gical access to the cultural phenomena and 
their multiplicity, and the presumed objecti-
vity which is required as a guarantee to truth 
claims by theorists of culture. First, there is 
a claim that any member of a given group 
belongs to and understands itself within and 
in terms of its own culture. But this would 
mean that there cannot be any privileged 
persons who could “escape” their own cul-
tural understanding in order to see it from 
“outside.” How does one “alienate” oneself 
from one’s culture, if the very culture regards 
itself as alienating? 
One is already stuck in a cultural po-
sition and hence cannot claim to have any 
culturally impartial attitude. Indeed, the very 
comprehension of impartiality is an aspect of 
a given culture. Second, the major solution 
to this issue may be offered by some of the 
major comparative theories. The latter want 
to argue that it is possible to understand one’s 
own culture from the vantage point of com-
parison with another culture. This suggests 
that one knows another culture by being im-
mersed in it and hence having obtained a si-
milar comprehension as the “natives.” This is 
to say, from this position one may claim that 
it is possible to see one’s own culture in terms 
of the limits that the other culture offers. The 
other culture is, after all, radically different, 
and we understand ourselves and the other in 
terms of such difference. 
Given this complex claim, it is impossi-
ble to offer a methodology that would allow 
us to understand our own culture, since, seen 
from the culture of the other, our culture is al-
ready incorporated and interpreted in terms 
of the other culture. This means that either 
one picks up another culture as a limit of one’s 
own and interprets it in terms of one’s own 
cultural grammar and hence has not escaped 
the problem of seeing one’s culture at its limit, 
or one adopts the other culture and translates 
one’s own culture in terms of the grammar of 
the other culture. In neither case has one gai-
ned any methodological access to one’s own, 
and indeed to the other’s culture. 
To speak pedagogically, if I am going 
to lecture on another culture, and claim 
that it is radically different from my own, I 
shall do so in terms of my language that is 
comprehensible to the audience to which I 
am communicating. Both, the audience and 
I understand the other culture by giving it 
our own cultural context and grammar of 
interpretation. The same can be said in re-
verse, when talking in terms of the other cul-
ture about our culture; in this case what we 
would get is the other’s incorporation of our 
culture into their context and grammar, and 
hence without offering anything more than 
their cultural frame – but comprehensible 
only to those who are part of, or have been 
immersed in the culture of the other. Third, 
we face, what could be called the hysteria of 
objectivity. By “hysteria” I mean the shock 
that objectively speaking other cultures have 
to be treated as equivalent to our own. We at-
tempt “histerically” to deny this equivalence 
by imposing our own globalization without 
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noticing the contradictory position in which 
we find ourselves. 
This is to say, the scientific modern Wes-
tern pronouncement that everything has to 
be treated with objective impartiality, requi-
res the positing of our own culture as one 
among others, having no right to claim to be 
privileged in its various pronouncements. But 
this is the hysterical point: the claim to scien-
tific objectivity is one aspect of Western mo-
dern culture and belongs to the interpretive 
context of this culture. Hence, the very claim 
to Western scientific superiority as having 
methods to access all phenomena objective-
ly, is a culture bound position that cannot be 
universal without a contradiction. After all, 
“objectively speaking” other cultures, as equ-
al, have very different understandings that do 
not include such tandems as “objectivity” or 
for that matter “subjectivity.” 
Culturally objectively speaking, we 
cannot deny them their different reading of 
cultural, and indeed all other, phenomena. 
To say that the others are wrong would be 
tantamount to saying that while it is modern 
Western culture, it is also a criterion of a “uni-
versal culture.” But in this sense, one abolis-
hes the treatment of other cultures as given 
objectively and equivalently. We then would 
posit our culture as universal and require that 
all others interpret themselves in terms of our 
own requirements. Yet, by the claim of trea-
ting all other cultures objectively and without 
prejudice, we have just offered a position that 
requires (1) the treatment of other cultures 
not as they are but as they are interpreted 
in terms of one culture’s requirements, or 
(2) of surrendering our cultural prejudice of 
objectivity, and allowing other cultures their 
modes of awareness that do not regard them-
selves as either objective or subjective. Given 
this setting, we revert back to the problematic 
mentioned above: how can one claim to know 
the other “objectively” when one has imposed 
one’s own cultural component of “objectivity” 
on others and hence not only did not unders-
tand the other culture, but failed to escape 
one’s own culture. In this sense, the very claim 
to be able to treat one’s own culture objective-
ly, is to accept this very culture without any 
“objectivity,” since one already lives and ac-
cepts the terms of her own culture.
Given this problematic, we can note 
the minor variations that face the same non-
sensical dilemmas. Various Western critical 
cultural movements posit implicit valuati-
ve postures that seem to show the limits of 
our own and those of other peoples cultures. 
The limits rest with the claim of cultural re-
lativism. By the very logic of being culture 
bound, any claim to cultural relativism be-
comes an aspect of one culture and thus cea-
ses to be a universal necessity. Moreover, the 
limit is also reached with the tacit assump-
tion that despite their radical differences, all 
cultures are human. If this assumption were 
not present, then we would end up in a po-
sition wherein each culture defines its own 
members in a unique way such that what is 
human in one need not be human in anot-
her – indeed in some cultures there may not 
be “humans” at all, since they may not have 
such terms as “human.” But if the claim is 
made that despite variations all cultures are 
human, then we have to admit an awareness 
of ourselves and others as human. This awa-
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reness has not been articulated in modern/
postmodern philosophies.
Due to this modern context, we have 
reached a point at which every culture is 
regarded to be self generating without any 
ontological, metaphysical, or theological 
grounds. If there are such grounds, then they 
are equally inventions of a specific culture. 
This is to say the modern globalizing position 
led to the conclusion that all discourses are 
autonomously constituted and, therefore, are 
equivalent to one another. After all, there are 
no criteria external to such discourses which 
will allow the adjudication among them con-
cerning any truth claims. If there is anything 
common among them, it is their difference. 
Given this autonomous level, the theories that 
at times may still claim that some discourses 
somehow represent something are no longer 
maintainable. But this also implies that the-
re is no misrepresentation. A particular dis-
course that frames a cultural world view is in 
no position to either represent the Others or 
to misrepresent them. 
The only thing that can be suggested is 
that each discourse inclusive of cultural dis-
courses, will interpret Others within the pa-
rameters of a giving discourse. This is of cour-
se premised on the basis of the abolition of an 
essential presence of a subject or a structure 
of the world. But this essentialism has been 
already destroyed by the assumption that even 
the modern subject has no essence, but must 
make himself in terms of the very discourses 
that he will invent. In this sense, the multicul-
tural proposition is not premised on a pregi-
ven essentialism, but in fact is constituted on 
the globalizing modern self destruction of an 
essential subject. The only criterion that this 
globalizing self invention, both of the indivi-
dual subjectivity and multicultural identities, 
is its practical efficiency. It is not a question 
of the nature of the world, or the essence of 
the subject, but a view toward what works. If 
there is a claim that a particular people have 
specific needs, then technical discourses and 
practices will be devised and offered. 
For multiculturalism the question that 
must be addressed is whether a given culture 
with its own constituted discourses has the 
same practical global needs that the globali-
zing autonomy is offering. This is to say does 
a particular cultural discourse allows the de-
finition of the environment to be reduced to 
homogenous resources for arbitrary recons-
truction? The first limit of modern non-es-
sential conception of total and unconditional 
possibility of inventing any discourse for the 
sake of applying it for „human needs“ may be 
given in the discourses of Other cultures. In 
order to set a limit for globalizing moderni-
ty, we must demonstrate that within the logic 
of this globalization there is also a reflective 
recognition that it as invented culture must 
respect the equivalences of other invented 
cultures without any other criteria apart from 
those that each cultural discourse possesses 
within itself. This means that if another cul-
ture has a different ontology and even metap-
hysics then there are no reasons why that on-
tology or metaphysics should be disregarded 
or rejected, because it does not operate with 
the supposed efficiency, productivity, and ex-
ploitation of the homogenized environment 
and functional human. The limit would be set 
with the lack of primacy of instrumental ra-
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tionality. If the meaning of life of a particular 
people within their own cultural parameters 
does not require the fulfillment of indefinite 
multitude of pleasures, variety of middle class 
consumptions, then that culture must be in 
principle, and on the basis of globalizing mo-
dern logic permitted to pursue its own mode 
of having a lifeworld. 
To sharpen our argument and the para-
meters within which the discussion of globa-
lization and multiculturalism could play out 
its destiny, we suggest that the very abolition 
of a pregiven subject in favor of self inventi-
on in modern sense leads to the notion not 
only that the Others are equally self inventive, 
but also the limitation of the concept of the 
self invention to the modern logic of Wes-
tern autonomy and instrumentality. This is 
to say that if every discourse is deemed to be 
invented and only valid within its own frame-
work, then the very concept of discursive self 
generation belongs within the framework of 
modernist and Western postmodernist dis-
course. 
But this means that even if the Other 
cultures are regarded as self generated, their 
self generation may have very different self 
conceptions, ontologies, methods, and practi-
ces that did not respect the logic of moderni-
zing and globalizing ontologies and methods. 
Practically speaking this means that whate-
ver purposes there are and however the en-
vironment is interpreted need no follow the 
logic of causal efficiency of reconstructing the 
world into our own needs and power. If a cul-
ture regards that playing music, listening to 
the stories of the ancients is meaningful and 
the metaphysical entities are relevant for life 
as protectors of the environment then there 
cannot be an introduction of a criterion that 
would claim that such conceptions are not 
realistic, mystical, non productive, since the 
latter concepts belong to another framework. 
In brief, the confrontation between the two 
is not between some truth and some falsi-
ty, but between two discursive frameworks, 
wherein each will interpret the Other in its 
own unique way.
Yet it is also the case that a globalizing 
logic with its technical efficiency and promise 
of better life is an aspect of the Others. They 
see themselves in relationship to this efficient 
liberation from natural necessities, which be-
comes part of their own self understanding as 
different from and yet related to this globa-
lizing logic. This creates an internal tension 
within various cultures that constitute dual 
self recognition wherein one still maintains 
his own cultural discourses yet also judges 
those discourses in light of the global Other. 
This is the source of alienation and destruc-
tion of cultural self identity. We still want to 
maintain cultural identity, but we also like to 
be like the Other, to judge our selves from the 
vantage point of the Other. This is an inven-
tion of a dual consciousness that frames the 
power struggles within various cultures. The 
modernizers who at the same time claim to 
be part of the same culture want to transform 
that culture into civilized, practically effici-
ent, objective, and beneficial. While it libera-
tes the individuals from her own culture yet 
there is a wish to claim against the globalizing 
process the uniqueness of her own culture. In 
one sense, there is a demand to use the envi-
ronment in a „desacralized“ manner, purely 
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for the purpose of the benefit of social mem-
bers, whether the benefit is health, employ-
ment, increased wages as signs of the good 
life. 
In another sense, there is a wish to claim 
that we in our culture have our spiritual va-
lues that do not allow reducing the environ-
ment, including the human, to mere resour-
ces. Within this tension, the adjudication 
cannot be had on the basis of some criteria 
that would be able to adjudicate which is 
more true. The only solution to this tension 
is power. Hence, we witness the many conf-
rontations between the groups within given 
cultures that promote modernizations and at 
the same time intellectuals who resist moder-
nizations. This means that a given culture is 
split into those who propagate the need to be-
come globalized and modern and at the same 
time those who, recognizing the necessity of 
modernization, propose a battle against it as 
imposition of alien culture. In principle, they 
claim that we may use the efficiency of mo-
dern technology to resist the very logic that 
this technology imposes on us. In this sense, 
the very globalizing logic constitutes a power 
confrontation, all the way from holy wars to 
so-called passive resistances. Yet, in every 
case it seems that the reason for this power 
confrontation rest in the failure to unders-
tand the already posited limit within which 
the globalizing process must function. 
This limit is the very requirement that 
the Other and its self generated cultural fra-
mework is equivalent to the globalizing logic. 
Therefore, the latter sees to be universal and 
yet it must accept whether it wants to or not 
its own limitations. When we say whether 
wants it or not, we do not mean a choice bet-
ween two options, but a power confrontation 
that is inevitable since there are no external 
criteria in this confrontation that would allow 
free decision. What we have is a temporal ho-
rizon of possibilities in such a way that one 
possibility is regarded to be recuperation of 
the past, while the other is offered as the fu-
ture. Politically speaking, the rhetoric states 
that the one from the past is conservative and 
traditional, while the other is liberal, indivi-
dualistic open, and even humanistic. Whe-
ther this designation is true or false is not our 
concern. Yet it is generally claimed that those, 
in their dual consciousness, will play out their 
roles as both maintaining their tradition and 
at the same time proposing future transfor-
mations. 
At this point, a specific conception of the 
world of time is divided into closed past and 
open future. This conception subtends or un-
derlies Western modern globalization: anyt-
hing in the past can no longer be changed and 
therefore to return to it would mean to return 
to something changeless and thus conserva-
tive, while the escape from it would require 
an open and undetermined future projected 
by the will. This is the confrontation between 
any given tradition as a determined history 
and its rejection in favor of constructed and 
undetermined future. It is of note that the 
modern Western globalization is characteri-
zed by the shift of temporal awareness from 
the rejection of the „irrelevant“ past to pos-
sibilizing future. The Western globalization is 
premised on an implicit construction of time 
awareness that leads to the rejection of anyt-
hing that is permanent or with set limits. 
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Our challenge at the cultural level is 
whether this time awareness is universal. The 
cultural logics must be investigated within the 
parameters of peoples’ understanding of their 
world not only in terms of the lifeworlds and 
discursive practices, but also the lifeworlds 
that are subtended by the cultural preconcep-
tions of what constitutes the universe as time. 
Within this context, we hope to articulate the 
limits wherein even the power confrontati-
ons of the dual consciousness find their own 
limitations. Each culture has its own world 
conceptions as conditions for their own self 
understanding. If there is going to be any 
adjudication among cultures underneath the 
power confrontations such adjudications will 
have to articulate the world conceptions of 
various peoples. In this sense, the challenge 
to the globalizing logic will not come from 
the acceptance by the Other of the efficient 
technical means that make their own cul-
ture inadequate, but by the recognition that 
their own culture has a very different world 
understanding. We know from other cultu-
res, whether Mayan, Hindu, or Taoist that the 
world understanding, even at the ontological 
or metaphysical levels, is different from the 
Western scientific and linear conceptions. 
So the task of cultural studies is to find the 
cosmic awareness that underlie their cultural 
parameters.
3. The Limit
In the life world of modern globalizati-
on there is a constant deflection away from 
the human and its replacement by systems of 
values that make the human into a seconda-
ry and dependent phenomenon. What Hei-
degger was afraid of in his Letter on Huma-
nism – the centering of all modern thought 
on the human, turns out to be a mistaken 
understanding. The human is not the center 
if we note the battle for values in current pu-
blic “debate.” In the U.S. the much publicized 
issue of “family values,” leading to the emo-
tional question as to who can marry whom, 
reveals a deflection from the human toward 
family, divine law, natural essentialism, social 
traditions, and genetic or cultural determin-
ants. While these are values in the public de-
bate, they release the human from any rights 
and above all from responsibilities. It is nature 
that makes us who we are, it is culture or soci-
al tradition that has shaped our way of being, 
and it is divine law that demands our com-
pliance. In all cases of such public debates, 
which may be deemed to be democratically 
guaranteed free speech, there is a constant 
rejection of such freedom by enlightenments 
tendency to “explain” and thus abolish the 
very public domain as that of autonomy. Even 
the latter is interpreted as one aspect of a con-
tingent fact based on a contingent history of 
one tradition. Given other tradition such a 
fact could not arise. Hence, its universality is 
particular and cannot be used to understand 
life worlds of other traditions. 
One result of the introduction of contin-
gency is the abolition of truth and its replace-
ment by rhetoric. If all depends on historical 
traditions and their modes of interpretation, 
then different traditions have different in-
terpretations, each claiming the right to its 
truths as equivalent with those of others. In 
addition, even a historical tradition is compo-
sed of a variety of histories with equal claim 
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to their truths and hence to an increasing 
contingency of what truth is, ending in the 
notion that “truth is whatever a given histo-
ry, a given culture, a given discipline, literary 
work, religious text may say.” They all have va-
lue and need not address any content; they all 
are equivalent rhetorical figures. And no one 
lies, since what an individual states depends 
on the framework of a particular culture and 
its requirements. In a business or corporate 
setting, where profit is of essence, one can tell 
anything as long as the statements made are 
valuable to enhance the incrementation of 
profit. One would be a fool to do otherwise. 
The same can be said of any discipline, 
specifically of any technical discipline. The 
latter are constructs and function on the basis 
of production of what is valuable for human 
consumpsion: whether it is designed food 
products or medications, the claim has to be 
made that each product is “contingent” and 
cannot be a cure for all ills. In this sense, the 
claims are statistical: the value of this product 
is presented with various disclaimers: in se-
venty percent of cases it will cure the liver, but 
it might cause high blood pressure, impoten-
cy, dizziness, and nightmares. And all these 
disclaimers are equally contingent. Thus one 
cannot say that the producers lie; they sim-
ply say that given the complexity of a specific 
organism, we cannot account for all possible 
implications. If something goes wrong with 
a given biotechnology, the answer is “we did 
not have sufficient evidence to warn against 
all results.” In principle, nonetheless, the 
human is a complex organism and nothing 
more, and the entire constructed environ-
ment is to maintain that organism. This is one 
major aspect of the crisis of democracy in the 
life world established by enlightenment.
What is crucial is the recognition of “va-
lue” as an invariant in this type of life world. 
What is at issue here is also the separation of 
value from fact. Facts, for modern ontology, 
have no value. Hence, values are constructed 
and imposed by us on facts. Such imposition 
takes on various forms, one of which is the 
globalization of “Western values” and, above 
all, of technocratic rulership by qualified ex-
perts. This globalization assumes that values 
can be exported; hence “democratic values” 
can be packaged and sent abroad on aircraft 
carriers, rockets, tanks and troops. It is dee-
med that anyone in the world would be more 
than pleased to welcome and “adopt” such 
values.
But values and valuations have to be 
evaluated not by their own self proliferating 
construction, but by a discovery of a consti-
tutive awareness that is correlated to a tacitly 
lived eidos offering the possibility of perfor-
ming a suspension of commitment to a given 
life world. The transcendental requirement is 
to disclose this eidos that would be an all per-
vasive presence demanding a transformation 
of a given, and specifically of the life world of 
political enlightenment. Instead of construc-
ted values, this eidos can be called WORTH. 
As we shall see, the latter cannot be 
constructed and it appears in the background 
of all values and valuations. It also provides 
a background on which every life world can 
be regarded in its essential morphology and 
questioned concerning its legitimacy. In this 
sense, the first task is to explicate the life 
world of enlightenment, inclusive of its two 
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essential aspects, democracy and domination 
by experts, and to note their internal and ine-
vitable connection and, in the final analyses 
inadequacy. The latter lies in its constructive 
character and hence comprises a fundamen-
tal crisis of democracy. This is not to say that 
it is therefore invalidated. Rather, its limits are 
exhibited from a transcendental lived aware-
ness that demands “more” and does so on 
the basis of discovery what this more is. The 
constitution of this more – what will be called 
worth – is not a construction but a disclosure 
of an intentionality whose meant objectivity, 
its eidos as worth , is present as absolute. 
We should not despair while using the 
term absolute; after all, in all awareness there 
are such terms comprising a pregiven arche 
whose denial is its unavoidable inclusion. 
This is to say, to attempt to negate an arche 
is to include it in the very negation and hen-
ce to comprise its absolute affirmation. We 
shall call this the principle of self inclusion 
and venture a claim that only transcendental 
phenomenology is in a position to function 
within this principle. Now we are in a positi-
on to expound on the crisis of democracy by 
showing what sort of life world it has establis-
hed and the limits it has imposed upon itself.
It is necessary to turn to the essence of 
the life world of enlightenment in which we 
find ourselves. IT IS A PROCESS OF VALU-
ATION. Everything in the universe assumes 
a value to the extent that it serves our inte-
rests. Contrary to claims that the world has 
no value, the current world, constructed by 
enlightenment, is full of values: values for 
sale, values produced and to be produced, va-
lues of stocks and bonds, values of education, 
family values, religious values, ideologically 
constructed values, the changing and the new 
values, value of life and even calculated death. 
Indeed, the basic mode of awareness is valu-
ative selectivity. It should be clear also that 
awareness and perception are no longer given 
in some pure empirical sense, but are selec-
ted on the grounds of valuation. In this sense, 
what is given as a plethora of empirical envi-
ronment is, for the most part, ignored. What 
is perceived depends on its specific value.
Indeed, there are social mechanisms that 
not only consist of values, but evaluation of 
values that select specific ones deemed cur-
rently relevant in terms of future value pro-
jects. It has been argued that all these values 
are human and hence the primacy is placed 
on modern subject as the source of values. 
This claim would hold if the human were a 
distinct and decisive category, wherein all 
other categories and processes were subser-
vient to humans. But this is no longer the 
case, since other values, such as technologies 
of various sorts, from electronic media to ge-
netic biochemistry compel the understanding 
of the human to be equivalent to the rest of 
the values. 
This means that genetic biochemistry 
will not treat the human as a special category, 
but will have to reduce all human functions to 
biochemistry. Thus the environment, that is 
constructed on the basis of the process of va-
luation and is deemed to be objective, requi-
res that the human be treated equally objec-
tively in terms of what such an environment 
demands, i.e. interpretation of the human as 
material, chemical, biological, physical enti-
ty in order that such constructed technical 
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values could be applied and thus useful and 
valuable. The public domain, once deemed 
the space of autonomous beings, has become 
a battle ground of values: what is more valu-
able, jobs or forests, production or clean air, 
god or freedom of choice? 
The awareness of crises constitutes a 
unique reflective moment that, at the same 
time, allows a suspension of one’s participa-
tion in a given life world. We are cognizant, 
by now, that while living in a particular life 
world we are not aware of its basic compo-
sition. We live in it as if it were self evident 
and all inclusive. There is nothing lacking in it 
to the extent that it would not offer relief and 
answers to all of our questions. If we claim 
to live in a democratic life world, we take 
for granted that our elected officials tend to 
lie, that we can vote them out of office, that 
the injustices can be corrected by legal me-
ans, and that those who work harder deserve 
more. We also know that we would not tole-
rate dictators or anyone who would deny our 
right to make our own choices and mistakes. 
There must be a unique situation which al-
lows us to extricate from our life world and to 
raise the question of its legitimacy. 
That such a question can arise means 
that we rise to lived awareness which no lon-
ger belongs to a life world in which we live. 
This must be made clear: our awareness is al-
ways world oriented and our orientations, or 
intentional directions find, in their life world 
if not total, at least partial perceptual affirma-
tion. This is an epistemic aspect which takes 
for granted the division of our life world into 
categories and the way they are concretized 
or given perceptual fulfillment. But the ful-
fillment of our taken for granted intentions 
and the categories to which they correlate, 
including the numerous value gradations – 
the epistemic understanding – leave out the 
legitimating question given in live awareness 
that something is not fulfilled, something that 
no value can account for: INTRINSIC SELF 
WORTH. 
To reach the latter, the lived awareness 
must suspend the life world and explicate the 
access to the transcendental lived awareness 
that correlates to intrinsic self worth and de-
mands legitimation of the life world in which 
one has so far lived in full belief and affirma-
tion. The lived awareness and its intention 
toward self worth asks whether the life world 
offers any fulfillment and confirmation of this 
intention. At this level of awareness the cate-
gorical and epistemic understanding fails, 
and an existential question of action beco-
mes preeminent. Can I act, as I have always 
acted, and fulfill the intention of my intrinsic 
self worth? The latter embodies such requi-
rements as honor, honesty, dignity, self and 
other respect, and justice. If honor, honesty, 
dignity and respect cannot be fulfilled in my 
activities, then the legitimacy of this life world 
is placed in absolute question, revealing at 
the same time the awareness of ABSOLUTE 
SELF WORTH. 
It is at this juncture that the transcen-
dental lived awareness recognizes that the 
world of values, constructed by Enlighten-
ment, requires evaluation as to its adequacy 
for human worth. Such a question is one of 
principle that required an essential delimita-
tion of the construct of democracy and whet-
her the latter could be adjusted, discarded or 
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become open to the absolute requirement of 
transcendental awareness of self worth. We 
are in a position, now to attempt our venture 
into lived awareness that is lead by the inten-
tion correlated to self worth and thus a crisis 
in enlightenment. 
There is no need to go into a variety of 
utilitarianisms since in principle they follow 
the logic of valuation on the basis of psycho-
physiological needs. Utilitarianisms have no 
philosophical importance, since they presu-
me that we all seek pleasure and value things 
and others insofar as they will comprise some 
means to fulfill our pleasures. Indeed, such a 
psychologized ethos is precisely what leads 
to crisis of democracy insofar the technical 
promises by elected officials to fulfill our ple-
asures lead the public away from public parti-
cipation and hence maintenance of the public 
domain. Besides, striving to fulfill pleasures 
suggests our complete subjection to irrational 
drives and a loss of any sense of autonomy. 
Hence, our task is to seek a more profound 
conception of enlightenment’s failure to pro-
vide the ground of its ethos. 
We already know that the highest point 
of Enlightenment, Kant’s critical works, have 
left us with a quandary regarding the final ar-
biter in human action. It was not the univer-
sal moral imperative demanding that we act 
out of respect for this imperative originating 
as it were out of total autonomy, but the emp-
ty condition called good will. It is empty be-
cause it is purely formal and has no existential 
implications. There is no content by which to 
decide what sort of action would be recogni-
zable as one that follows good will. It is to 
be noted that the universal moral imperati-
ve, having total autonomy as its source, does 
not require a commitment to others, apart 
from not treating them as means but always 
as ends. Being universal, this imperative does 
not singularize and does not require respect 
for the other as having intrinsic worth; it sim-
ply requires obedience to the imperative or, as 
Kant would have it, obedience out of respect 
for the law. 
But respect for the law implies somet-
hing more basic, some lived awareness that 
connects to the worth of a singular person be-
yond his/her value and demands a treatment 
of oneself and the others in an honorable, 
noble, truthful, elevating manner for its own 
sake. This also suggests a crisis of democra-
cy insofar as it has been reduced for the sake 
of other purposes such, as Regan once boas-
ted, making money and getting rich. It seems 
that the loss of democracy for its own sake is 
premised on the reduction of the human to 
a purposive value and thus the exclusion of 
worth for its own sake. The transcendental 
rule that emerges at this level of awareness 
is THE DEGRADATION OF THE HUMAN 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT TO A PURPO-
SIVE VALUE AND, BY IMPLICATION, VA-
LULESNESS. Yet both democratic ethos and 
the final arbiter of all values cannot be value; 
they are for their own sake and comprise a 
lived awareness that already recognizes in-
trinsic self worth as that which is coextensive 
with democratic ethos. Self worth and demo-
cratic ethos for their own sake comprise the 
lived awareness of the missing aspect of the 
way that enlightenments intentionality has 
unfolded. Here a person is exposed to treat 
the lived world, and her immersion in it, as 
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inadequate and thus place such a world and 
herself out of play, in brackets.
It is, then, the task to unfold the lived 
awareness that is compelled to bracket, to 
place out of action, the life world of enligh-
tenment and to note the presence of this lived 
awareness across diverse phenomena. All the 
intentional orientations toward a life world in 
which she has been immersed appear to be 
groundless constructs; the life world of pu-
blic domain, which is no longer maintained, 
requires and recognizes a presence of intrin-
sic self worth even in its denial. In the most 
degraded figures that our age has produced 
there appears an intimation of self worth. 
Let us look at the logic of intrinsic worth. 
In the life world where everything is a trash 
bin of values, there emerge personal actions 
and expressions that demand honor, dignity, 
respect, truthfulness, not only of themselves 
but of others. Indeed, their actions are equally 
an indication of intrinsic self worth of others. 
It would be impossible to be a racist and de-
grade others without recognizing the other as 
a possessor of intrinsic self worth. We cannot 
degrade a creature who, in its life world, does 
not recognize a need to justify its deeds, to 
make a choice between two life worlds; in 
short, to call a dog – dog, is neither a degra-
dation nor a negation of intrinsic worth. Only 
another person can be degraded on the basis 
of recognition of her intrinsic worth. This is 
to say, degradation, reduction, insult, are pos-
sible only when we recognize hers and our 
own intrinsic worth, honor, and dignity. This 
recognition is the ground of numerous events 
of our sophisticated age, among which is ra-
cism, nationalism, ethnocentrism and even 
homophobia and religions. 
Degrading of others in an effort to ele-
vate oneself, is an indication of the worth of 
others, an indication of our anxiety in face of 
the other’s intrinsic self worth, her unavoi-
dable height. Unable to withstand the other’s 
self worth, we condemn her to death and thus 
prove that we are unwilling to admit our own 
self degradation, our own crisis, and cannot 
withstand the dignity of the intrinsic self 
worth of another. Such awareness is demons-
trated by Viktor Frankel’s depictions of life in 
concentration camps. This is an extreme case 
where the officers who ran the camps would 
immediately condemn to death anyone who 
showed self and other respect, dignity and 
honor, thus revealing the lack of honor and 
dignity in the very officers – and all degraded 
to a mere value for the state. This logic calls to 
the others to recognize the crisis in their lives, 
to legitimate the life world in which they live 
and to ask whether such a life world fulfills 
their lived awareness of their intrinsic worth. 
This is to say, the very presence of the other 
who is aware of her intrinsic worth performs 
a tacit phenomenological bracketing and 
hence challenges a blind inherence in this life 
world. One can then raise a question whether 
such a life world is worthy of one’s intrinsic 
worth.
Intrinsic self worth, as a discovered gi-
ven, appears not only through degradations 
and oppressions, but also through actions 
demanding mutual recognition of self and 
other. And it appears irrespective of culture, 
historical period, or social standing. Gandhi 
angered colonial rulers by his bearing, his 
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dignity, his dignifying those who were at the 
lowest social rung, his demand that the colo-
nial rulers have truthfulness and honor and 
thus made them recognize their own intrin-
sic worth and not merely their value for the 
empire. 
Gandhi reminded all that the life world 
of an empire is illegitimate because it does not 
allow the fulfillment of the lived awareness of 
intrinsic worth. Hence he asked for legitima-
tion of his own value in such a life world and 
whether he must rise to a transcendental level 
and reveal a crisis in his own life and that of 
the empire based on recognition of what is 
the ground of final human self awareness and 
all the values. While being an object of derisi-
on and quixotic depictions, he took the blows 
with dignity, demanding dignity from those 
who administered the blows. It is to be no-
ted that he did not claim intrinsic self worth 
as a value of a specific culture, but as an un-
conditional and absolute ground that raises 
the question of legitimation of any life world 
and demands the fulfillment of transcenden-
tal awareness that correlates to self worth. 
Einstein once pondered the phenomenon of 
Gandhi by wondering “that such a person 
could have walked among us.” In face of the 
intrinsic self worth of this slight person, the 
British Empire lost all of its moral, political, 
and military superiority. 
We reached a juncture at which the 
founder of Western philosophy – Socrates – 
can make his entrance. Although scholars lo-
cate Socrates as the relentless seeker of truth, 
i.e. categorical epistempologist, we must also 
recall that the first condition of the search for 
truth is the good and a life world where a per-
son can live in accordance with the demands 
of the good as one expression of intrinsic 
worth. Only under these conditions that So-
crates can search for truth as another aspect 
of intrinsic worth. After all, the search for 
truth was, for Socrates, a practical-existential 
commitment and activity of a good and trut-
hful life. Thus Socrates, like many others, was 
an object of derision and caricatures. He ac-
cepted the Athenian verdict of death in order 
to show that his and others intrinsic worth 
demands a life world in which the search 
for truth cannot be forbidden. He placed his 
internal worth as the good above his perso-
nal life and could demand that such a good 
should be a part of his life world. 
The decision by the jury to forbid So-
crates his daimon, his eros, to “philosophi-
ze” was equivalent to a destruction of a life 
world in which his intrinsic worth once had 
a place. Socrates is compelled to face a crisis 
and reveal a crisis of his life world. He reaches 
and lives an awareness that places his entire 
life world into question and demands a deci-
sion: Is the life world, offered by Athenians, 
adequate to fulfill his intrinsic self worth. In 
turn, are the Athenians, by their own action, 
degraded themselves to a level of social va-
lue where truth, dignity, honor, will have no 
place. After all, such a degradation to social 
value is obvious from the trial when Socrates 
is offered a chance to surrender his troubleso-
me quest and thus become a valuable citizen, 
and when Socrates offers, ironically, to accept 
a pension from the state for “whatever little 
services that he might render.” Here appears a 
depiction of the first crisis of democracy and 
Socrates reaches a lived awareness which de-
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mands a legitimation of the life world which 
is being offered to him. Can his lived aware-
ness, correlated as it is to intrinsic self worth, 
have any perceptual affirmation in such a life 
world? The latter, after all, demands self de-
gradation and thus the denial of self worth. 
Socrates resolves the crisis by accepting the 
verdict of the Athenians with a warning: If 
you condemn me, my fame will spread far 
and wide; do not do this, because it will be 
forever a black mark on Athens.
The responsibility of an intellectual is to 
raise the question of the legitimacy of any life 
world with respect to the lived fulfillment of 
intrinsic self worth. Here, all cultural value 
constructs as to what human being is are ren-
dered transparent as to their arbitrariness and 
inadequacy, demanding the recognition that 
despite the variation of cultures and their va-
lues, there is a transcendental trace of self and 
other worth that is taken for granted even if 
not recognized. Such recognition is the limit 
which cannot be transgressed without ma-
king cultures and their values meaningless. 
What was given in modern Western as 
a background awareness, is now in the fo-
reground of the life world of enlightenment 
and the unfolding of the constructive-valu-
ative intentionality that has become preva-
lent. Being in the foreground or “positional” 
and thematized this awareness points to the 
problem of legitimation and to the illegiti-
mate ways that the basic awareness became 
obfuscated, degraded, perverted, and empty. 
It questions the claim of this life world to be 
the only legitimate reality. This claim to sole 
reality appears only when the self worth be-
comes a foreground, enacted by a singular 
being in quest for an authentic fulfillment of 
self worth in a life world that at one stroke is 
made inactive, placed out of play. 
On the background of the life world that 
is placed out of play in its totality there appe-
ars a quest to act in favor of a world that would 
contain self worth. With the placing out of 
play, the life world without human worth is 
exposed to temporality: it becomes chronos-
copic, i.e. an inadequate temporal perspective 
on the reality of the essence of the human. 
Such temporalization suggests that there is an 
atemporal, non-positional awareness which, 
inevitably can appear only chronoscopical-
ly. It is equally important to note that since 
the disclosure of self worth revealed it to be 
solely as activity and not accessible through 
categorical intuition, then honor, dignity, no-
bility, truthfulness and justice appear only as 
enacted phenomena and hence have validity 
to the extent of their enactment. In addition, 
the striving to enact intrinsic worth is also a 
chronoscopic awareness, since no single ac-
tivity, whether honorable, noble or truthful, 
does not fulfill the entirety of the search for 
self worth. As an activity for its own sake, self 
worth also demands, as already suggested, 
public domain wherein such activity can be 
performed, resulting in the notion that such a 
domain is to be maintained for its own sake. 
Both, self worth and public domain are phe-
nomena that mutually require one another 
and hence are to be maintained as purposes 
in themselves. 
Yet even the awareness of such purposes 
in themselves requires one more domain of 
awareness. The disclosure of intrinsic worth 
as atemporally present, but only chronosco-
 57
Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas 2008/2 (22), ISSN 1392-3358 Politikos sociologija
pically experienced, requires a specific cons-
titution of activity. As we know, awareness is 
oriented toward the world. Yet such orienta-
tion is experienced reflectively, such that the 
world becomes represented and the self beco-
mes represented as awareness that is turned 
toward the world. In view of her orientation 
as intentional aim, she also finds confronted 
by herself. Such orientation toward the world 
in face of oneself is the ESSENCE OF ACTI-
VITY. Given the awareness of such activity, 
the latter places another demand: not only 
reflection that represents an aim toward the 
world and the one who intends such an aim, 
but above all asks for legitimation as to the 
worth of such an action. At this level one does 
not ask whether such a world is known – this 
is already granted, but is this world worthy of 
one’s activity. The possibility of constituting a 
worthy life world is the reflective condition 
from which the failures of our degraded life 
world become visible.
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AbSTRACT 
The question of intellectual responsibility in confrontation with globalization is the philosophical 
question from Socratic to modern philosophies. In brief, it is impossible to practice philosophy and not 
to raise this question. It is well known that Socrates stood his ground unto death with the demand that 
he and others have a duty to interrogate all claims to truth regardless of their origin. Intellectual honesty 
was for him a requirement to keep open the discursive domain – called the polis – wherein the search for 
truth could be pursued. This means that the task of philosophy as such is identical with the maintenance 
of an open polis wherein all theories and propositions can be tested and contested. Hence, when we raise 
the question of the responsibility of the intellectual, we must recall the task for philosophy set by Socrates. 
Yet our situation is quite different from that of classical Athens. We are confronted by modern philosophy 
in its ontological and metaphysical guises that require a serious consideration whether we can even think 
of the relationship between intellectual and responsibility. It is our task, then, to consider what sort of 
position will open up for an intellectual that would be worthy of philosophy.
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